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INTRODUCTION
The United States experienced twenty-one recessions in the
twentieth century.1 In the twenty-first century, we have already
experienced two recessions: one in 2001, the other our current
economic crisis, which began in 2007.2 Recessions are a regular,
t Anton R. Valukas is a member of the law firm of Jenner & Block LLP in Chicago,
where he serves on the Firm's governing Policy Committee. He served as the United
States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois from 1985 to 1989. During that peri-
od, he prosecuted a wide variety of corruption and financial crime cases. While in private
practice, he represents individuals and corporations at trial in matters involving commer-
cial, civil, and regulatory disputes as well as defending them in white-collar criminal
cases. He is a Fellow of the American College of Trial Lawyers. In 2008-2010, he served
as Examiner in the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc. This Article is based
on a keynote address delivered at the University of Chicago Legal Forum Symposium in
October 2009. I would also like to thank Charles B. Sklarsky, Robert R. Stauffer,
Katherine Neff Welsh, and Adam C. G. Ringguth for their assistance in the preparation of
this article. The opinions expressed by the author in this article are solely his own and do
not necessarily represent the opinions of Jenner & Block LLP or of the author's clients.
1 The United States experienced recessions in 1900, 1902-04, 1907-08, 1910-12,
1913-14, 1918-19, 1920-21, 1923-24, 1926-27, 1929-33, 1937-38, 1945, 1948-49, 1953-
54, 1957-58, 1960-61, 1969-70, 1973-75, 1980, 1981-82, and 1990-91. A History of
Recessions, CNBC.com (Sept 4, 2007), online at httpV/www.cnbc.com/idV20510977 (visited
Apr 11, 2010).
2 According to the National Bureau of Economic Research, the U.S. economy has
been in recession since December 2007. Chris Isidore, It's Official: U.S. in a Recession
since Dec. '07, CNN.com (Dec 1, 2008), online at http//money.cnn.cor/2008/12/01/newsl
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apparently inevitable feature of the business cycle. So, apparent-
ly, are the steps we as a country take in response to these reces-
sions, in an attempt to address criminal behavior that is revealed
by-or believed to contribute to-economic downturns.
In this article, I will suggest that the interplay between the
American legal system and economic cycles has assumed a regu-
lar, predictable pattern consisting of two phases. First, in periods
of economic growth, there is a breakdown in regulatory oversight
of the market, generally caused by pressure on regulators not to
stand in the way of economic prosperity. The more sustained the
period of economic growth, the less people see the need for regu-
lation and the more complacent the regulators become. Regulato-
ry complacency allows deleterious practices to develop undetect-
ed and go unpunished. The second phase begins with the onset of
an economic recession, which brings with it a wave of white-
collar prosecutions and calls for tighter regulation. In good times,
the public turns a blind eye to questionable practices that devel-
op, but in a recession, a spotlight is shone on people making
money through dubious means. The worst offenders are thrown
in jail and millions of dollars are spent on prosecutions, but at
the end of the day, the justice system is rarely able to come close
to righting the damage caused by practices that could have, and
should have, been prevented by sound regulation during times of
prosperity.
The current recession, with its attendant wave of prosecu-
tions and calls for further regulation, provides an opportune time
for us to make a simple point: we should be equally determined
to ferret out financial wrongdoing in times of economic prosperity
as we are in down cycles.
We will probably never be able to eliminate economic cycles,
but we can and should learn from malfeasance exposed in previ-
ous recessions in order to think about how best to deter the busi-
ness community from making white-collar crime and financial
fraud a routine feature of the business cycle.
When I was an Assistant US Attorney in Chicago in the
1970s, some of the first cases I prosecuted involved mortgage
fraud. We investigated and prosecuted individuals who defraud-
ed the government by processing mortgages guaranteed by the
Fair Housing Administration but extended to unqualified buyers.
Not surprisingly, these buyers would default when they could not
keep up the payments, and the government was left with a large
economy/recession/mdex.htm (visited Sept 28, 2010).
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number of foreclosed homes. It was the government guarantee of
the mortgage that facilitated the fraud.
Thirty years later, little has changed. The current recession
has been accompanied by revelations of widespread mortgage
fraud, and young Assistant US Attorneys across the country are
currently cutting their teeth by prosecuting dozens of individuals
who made millions by providing phony statements on mortgage
applications. 3
It need not be inevitable that, thirty years from now, a gen-
eration of young prosecutors not yet born will conduct yet anoth-
er wave of prosecutions for mortgage fraud in the midst of some
future recession-but to avoid that possibility, we need to learn
the lessons of history. The biggest obstacle we face is that every
time we experience a period of sustained prosperity, there is a
tendency to simply believe that widespread financial misconduct
can never happen again. When prosperity reigns, we choose to
believe the systems that we have put in place will protect us
against misconduct and excessive practices. We ignore warning
signs of dangers that in retrospect seem obvious. We forget that
human beings are given to greed and avarice and will take ad-
vantage of opportunities for short-term gain at the expense of
long-term stability.
As we follow the prosecutions coming in the wake of the cur-
rent recession and examine possibilities for regulatory improve-
ments, it is a good time to pay attention to the lessons that reces-
sions can teach us. The first step is simply to recognize the types
of wrongdoing that have often been exposed at times of economic
downturn. Secondly, we should understand why these practices
are allowed to flourish during times of economic prosperity, only
to be exposed during recessions. Finally, we should consider
what we can do now and what we should do when this recession
is over to ensure that the next downturn does not provide us with
yet another shocking revelation of widespread fraud and abuse in
our economy.
I. RECESSIONS EXPOSE PREVIOUSLY UNDETECTED SCHEMES
During times of economic prosperity, neither government
nor the public generally shows much interest in scrutinizing the
3 See generally Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2008 Mortgage Fraud Report "Year
In Review" (2009), online at httpV/www.fbi.gov/publications/fraud/mortgage-fraudO8.htm
(visited Sept 28, 2010); Peter Henderson, U.S. Mortgage Fraud 'Rampant" and Grow-
ing--FBI, Reuters (July 7, 2009).
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
activities of business and the financial sector. This tendency is
understandable: why should we spend limited resources on regu-
lators or criminal investigations to investigate why things are
going so well? However, when the economy plummets and inves-
tors are burned, people naturally ask the question, "How could
this have happened?", and its corollary, "Who is to blame?"
Regulators and prosecutors fix their gaze on the business world
and find no shortage of wrongdoing and corruption. Wrongdoing
and corruption are not necessarily the cause of economic reces-
sions, but typically recessions bring them to light.
The most obvious, though still stunning, example from our
current economic downturn is the case of Bernard Madoff, the
purveyor of what may well be the largest financial fraud in
American history.4 Over the course of the 2000s Madoff was able
to run a $65 billion Ponzi scheme. He offered his investors steady
15 percent returns. His investors spread news of the fund by
word of mouth, and only a select few were invited to join the club
and share in Madoff's spectacular returns. The fund's exclusivity
added to its allure. Indeed, there was a waiting list for those ea-
ger to invest their money in some of Madoff's funds.
So long as everyone was happy and reaping the benefits of
Madoff's scheme, no one was interested in investigating the
source of Madoff's returns, which turned out to be derived from
the money that other investors were paying into the scheme. It
was only when the economy soured and investors needed to pull
their money from Madoff to cover other losses, and when new
investment dollars could not be found to replace these withdraw-
als, that the scheme collapsed. Law enforcement did not catch
Madoff: the economy did.
We now know that the Securities and Exchange Commission
had received credible warnings from multiple sources that
Madoff's returns defied market realities. 5 But the SEC had no
interest in investigating successful funds whose investors were
delighted with their returns. It therefore made only cursory in-
vestigations of Madoff's funds. Opportunities to expose his bla-
tantly illegal practices were overlooked because of his very suc-
cess. Only the recession brought his wrongdoing to light.
4 For an overview of the Madoff fraud, see generally James Bandler, Nicholas
Varchaver, and Doris Burke, How Bernie Did It, 159 Fortune 10 (May 11, 2009).
5 US Securities and Exchange Commission Office of Investigations, Investigation of
Failure of the SEC to Uncover Bernard Madoif's Ponzi Scheme - Public Version 1, 1 (Aug
31, 2009), online at http/www.sec.gov/news/studies/2009/oig-509.pdf (visited Sept 28,
2010).
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Madoff is the latest in a long line of wrongdoers who were
only exposed in the midst of economic downturn. The Great
Depression revealed that several abusive practices had become
widespread among stock speculators and short sellers during the
1920s, including the offering of totally worthless securities. In
some instances these abuses escaped detection throughout the
1920s even though they were clearly criminal. There were many
reasons for that: the abuse may not have been seen as signifi-
cant, the abusive practice may have not been the target of en-
forcement resources, the sheer complexity of some of the schemes
may have concealed their illegality, or there may simply have
been no regulatory scheme in place to identify them.
In other instances, though, the abuses of the 1920s were not
necessarily criminal. They were, rather, what we might call "ex-
cessive practices"-destructive economic behavior that may have
been legal or operated in a gray area at the time that the conduct
took place. In some instances, this conduct may have even been
praised as being creative, though it was later revealed to have
negative consequences. It was only once the negative conse-
quences became evident that the behavior was exposed to public
scrutiny and legislators scrambled to regulate or criminalize it.
A more recent example of excessive practices came in the
1990s. Business executives and accountants devised complex
transactions that yielded profits or tax savings but which had no
economic substance. At the time, many of those executives and
accountants were praised as "creative" professionals. In 2000 and
2001, however, the profits of some of the most admired Fortune
500 companies were revealed to have been purely ephemeral.
Enron, which had been named by Fortune magazine as the "most
innovative" company for six consecutive years prior to its col-
lapse and which had been lauded in the press as the handiwork
of the "smartest guys in the room," went bankrupt. Enron's prof-
its were discovered to have been driven by creative accounting,
not by a sound business model. 6 Another darling of Wall Street,
WorldCom, soon followed Enron into bankruptcy when it was
revealed that WorldCom had also been using accounting tricks to
grossly overstate its profits. 7
Most recently, our current economic downturn has drawn at-
tention to the excessive practices that apparently became perva-
6 For an overview of the Enron scandal, see generally Bethany McLean and Peter
Elkind, Enron: The Smartest Guys in the Room (Portfolio 2003).
7 For an overview of the WorldCom scandal, see generally Lynne W. Jeter,
Disconnected: Deceit and Betrayal at WorldCom (Wiley 2003).
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sive on Wall Street in the 2000s, including encouragement and
celebration of risk-taking without setting boundaries or recogniz-
ing the consequences. The result was the collapse of essentially
the entire US financial sector. In this instance, excessive prac-
tices have the potential to be even more devastating than crimi-
nal conduct. Excessive practices that were not clearly illegal
wreaked havoc on our financial system and contributed to an
economic downturn.
II. WHY CRIMINAL CONDUCT AND EXCESSIVE PRACTICES
FLOURISH DURING TIMES OF ECONOMIC PROSPERITY
When the economy turns sour, revelations of criminal con-
duct and excessive practices that appear to have contributed to
the downturn often lead the public to demand a swift and force-
ful response. The government responds by passing laws criminal-
izing the behavior at issue, increasing punishments for estab-
lished offenses, and increasing the number of prosecutors and
regulators. Unfortunately, this government response is often
driven as much by the politics of the day as by any rational con-
sideration of how to design a system that will prevent criminal
conduct and excessive practices from becoming widespread
during the next bull market.
If we are serious about deterring these practices in a mean-
ingful and systematic way, we must first answer two questions:
(1) who are the people who engage in these practices, and
(2) what systemic factors allow these practices to flourish?
A. Who Engages in Criminal Conduct and Excessive Practices?
I believe that most white-collar crime is deterrable. To un-
derstand how best to deter white-collar crime, we should begin
by looking at who has the propensity to engage in white-collar
criminal activity and who can be dissuaded from doing so.
We can divide people into four categories. At one extreme
are the "incorruptibles" or "untouchables." The incorruptibles are
those who will never engage in questionable or criminal conduct
under any circumstances. For me, the prime example of an "in-
corruptible" is Edward Levi, late Dean of the University of
Chicago Law School, who, as Attorney General of the United
States during the Ford Administration, restored the nation's
faith in the Justice Department in the wake of Watergate. At the
other extreme are those who are corrupt to the core and are un-
likely to be deterred by any measures that we in a free society
will allow ourselves to take. In this category, I place Al Capone.
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Many individuals, however, fall between these two extremes, and
here, we can take measures that will influence their behavior.
These individuals can perhaps be divided into two classes: the
"opportunists" and the "go along" crowd.
The opportunists are likely to engage in questionable prac-
tices or criminal activity when the reward is great and the likeli-
hood of being caught is low. This category could include people
who trade on insider information. However, these people can be
dissuaded from committing these crimes if they think they will
be caught and subjected to penalties that outweigh the reward.
The next group is the "go along" crowd-people who get
swept up by others' misdeeds and convince themselves that what
they are doing is really not so bad, that it is safe, or that it is the
norm. Those who backdated stock options may fall in this group.8
These people think, "Everyone else is doing it, so it must not be
so bad." This group, too, can be deterred from criminal conduct
and excessive practices.
B. Systemic Factors That Allow Criminal Conduct and
Excessive Practices to Flourish during Economic Prosperity
Few people are "born white-collar criminals." Most individu-
als who commit white-collar criminal activity or engage in exces-
sive practices fit into the categories of "opportunists" or members
of the "go along" crowd. These individuals will engage in criminal
or excessive practices when faced with certain systemic or envi-
ronmental factors and will not commit crimes when faced with
different systemic or environmental factors.
Based on my experience in the criminal justice system, I
suggest that there are three environmental or systemic factors
that allow white-collar crime and excessive practices to flourish:
(1) a lack of effective prosecution; (2) a lack of knowledge and
understanding by regulators and the public about potentially
excessive or criminal practices; and (3) failures by the regulatory
8 The 2006 prosecution and subsequent conviction of former Brocade CEO Gregory
Reyes shocked Silicon Valley because the practice of backdating options was so common
that virtually any Silicon Valley CEO could have been prosecuted for similar backdating.
See Daniel Fisher, Option Play, Forbes (Aug 17, 2006), online at http/www.forbes.com/
2006/08/16/back-dating-options-cz df 0817options.html (visited Sept 28, 2010); Carleen
Hawn, Silicon Valley Copes with Guilty Verdict, Financial Week (Aug 13, 2007), online at
http://www.financialweek.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070813/REG/70810031/1036
(visited Sept 28, 2010). The deterrent effect of this prosecution was great and is unlikely
to be lessened by the fact that Reyes's conviction was recently overturned. See Philip
Shishkin, Backdating Conviction of Reyes Overturned, Wall St J C3 (Aug 19, 2009).
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systems and gatekeepers that society relies upon to prevent im-
proper conduct.
1. Lack of prosecution.
During times of prosperity, the resources of the enforcement
and regulatory agencies are frequently allocated to areas other
than those involving potential financial fraud. In calculating
where to devote our prosecutorial resources during boom times,
we tend not to focus on complex white-collar crimes. The general
thought seems to be, "Why tinker with a system that is
working?" Instead, we commit our resources elsewhere. In the
1980s, enormous resources were committed to drug task forces
created to fight drugs, gangs, and street violence. It was only af-
ter the scandals on Wall Street and the Savings and Loan (S&L)
crises, that the government put significant resources into
fighting financial fraud.9 In the wake of 9/11, vast resources were
understandably shifted to fighting terrorism. Now, the govern-
ment is trying to plug the holes left by that shift, moving agents,
resources, and prosecutors back to prosecuting complex white-
collar crime. 10
2. Lack of knowledge and understanding.
The second environmental factor that allows these fraudu-
lent financial practices to flourish is a lack of knowledge about
them. Because these practices are often complex, or the resulting
harms are not obvious, they tend to operate without public scru-
tiny during times of economic prosperity and we do not focus on
their implications. When the economy falters and people begin to
look for answers, however, these practices are reviewed more
carefully.
For example, in 2000 there was nothing illegal or even im-
proper about an accounting firm earning millions of dollars in
consulting fees from the very companies whose books it was
auditing. At the time, it was just good business. It was only in
the aftermath of the accounting scandals that regulators recog-
' US Department of Justice, Office of the Deputy Attorney General, Corporate Fraud
Task Force, First Year Report to the President 2.2 (July 22, 2003), online at
http;//www.justice.gov/archive/dag/cftf/ru-st-year-report.pdf (visited Sept 28, 2010).
10 See generally US Department of Justice, Office of the Deputy Attorney General,
Corporate Fraud Task Force, 2008 Report to the President (2009), online at http/www.
justice.gov/archive/dag/cftf/corporate-fraud2008.pdf (visited Sept 28, 2010).
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nized the obvious and inherent conflict in this practice and took
steps to rein in excessive practices in this area.
But the problem goes beyond just acknowledging that the
practices exist-it goes to whether we can understand them well
enough to regulate or prosecute them.
When we undertook to prosecute financial fraud in the wake
of the S&L crisis and scandals, what we found was something
similar to our fight against terrorism in the Middle East: we
were hampered by our lack of expertise and the knowledge of the
customs and language of the area. We were slowed by our lack of
FBI agents, IRS agents, and postal inspectors who had the type
of sophisticated financial background necessary to investigate
and prosecute this criminal conduct. Prosecutors confronted with
a complex securities case had a steep learning curve. This pat-
tern continues as increasing complexity underlies the economy,
financial practices, and financial transactions that may be exces-
sive or criminal; the expertise of enforcement agencies tends to
lag behind. Just as Daniel Burnham said "make no small plans,"
the common wisdom is that white-collar criminals should "com-
mit no small crimes" because bigger and more complex financial
crimes are also more difficult to prosecute.
3. Failure of the regulatory system and gatekeepers.
The third and possibly the most significant factor allowing
criminal and excessive practices to flourish is failure by the regu-
latory system to control these practices-not just by government
regulators, but also by private gatekeepers. This is particularly
important in our complex economic system. As a society, we rely
on accountants, lawyers, ratings agencies, and auditors to act as
a check on illegal and excessive practices.
Gaps or failures in the regulatory scheme provide opportuni-
ties for individuals to engage in practices that we may later
question or deem criminal. White-collar crime is often a crime of
opportunity, and opportunities present themselves most often
when there are gaps in the regulatory system or where the gate-
keepers fail to perform their functions. Not only does the lack of
regulatory oversight provide opportunities for criminal behavior
on an individual scale, but these regulatory failures may also
play a significant role in causing the downturns in the first place.
In the early part of this decade the Enron and WorldCom
scandals and the dot-com bust illustrated a wholesale failure of
gatekeepers, including regulators, accountants, lawyers and
stock analysts. Stock analysts, who became the rock stars of the
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late 1990s and early 2000s, were not the objective observers of
the economic scheme that we believed them to be. Instead, they
had a financial stake in the advice that they provided. Yet their
advice was relied on to sell billions in stocks and helped brokers
to sell stocks that they had every reason to believe were overval-
ued.
At the same time, corporate America sought out "can do"
lawyers and accountants. Law firms and accountants looked for
ways around the regulatory scheme and gave opinions that, in
many instances, were central to assisting either the underlying
fraud or its subsequent concealment. In some instances they pro-
vided opinions that served as the excuses and rationales for what
was later determined to be excessive or criminal activity. In oth-
er instances, they failed to ask the hard questions and accepted
explanations that were lame at best. They did not press for an-
swers; they valued their relationship with their clients over their
duty to serve as gatekeepers. And they were richly rewarded for
their loyalty.
One prominent example was Gemstar, which had purchased
TV Guide and which provided guide services on television sets.
In March 2001, at the height of the tech frenzy, Gemstar was
creating quite a buzz. Business Week said, "Gemstar is something
of a Wall Street darling these days, winning a rush of new fans
with analysts putting out buy recommendations in the past two
months."11 Just a year later, in March 2002, Gemstar disclosed
$330 million in revenue restatements. By April 2003, the CEO
and CFO had been fired for cause and an alleged fraudulent
scheme had been exposed. 12 The CEO was later charged with
fraud. 13 The following year, the company's auditor, KPMG, was
sanctioned for improper professional conduct and fined $10 mil-
lion. 14
What is clear from the Gemstar debacle is that one of the
key gatekeepers-the accounting firm responsible for certifying
the company's financial statements-had failed in its responsibil-
11 Ronald Grover, Tom Lowy, and Larry Armstrong, Henry Yuen: TV Guy, Business
Week (Mar 12, 2001), online at httpV/www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/01_l1
b3723001.htm (visited Sept 28, 2010).
12 Saul Hansell, S.E.C. Says Ex-Gemstar Officials Used Deception to Inflate Revenue,
NY Times C1 (June 20, 2003).
13 Jane Spencer and Kara Scannell, As Fraud Case Unravels, Executive Is at Large,
Wall St J Al (Apr 25, 2007).
14 SEC, Press Release, KPMG LLP and Four Auditors Sanctioned for Improper Pro-
fessional Conduct in Connection with Gemstar-TV Guide International, Inc. Audits (Oct
20, 2004), online at http;//www.sec.gov/news/press/2004-147.htm (visited Sept 28, 2010).
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ity as a critical gatekeeper. Much of the information upon which
the government relied in prosecuting its fraud case had been
available to KPMG. In sanctioning KPMG, the SEC declared its
intent to "reinforce the message that accounting firms must as-
sume responsibility for ensuring that individual auditors proper-
ly discharge their special and critical gate keeping duties."15
Sometimes the failure of the regulators is simply an inability
to understand the opportunities for fraud created by their own
actions. A very simple rule change, done for reasons that seemed
appropriate at the time, may be at the heart of regulatory fail-
ures-particularly when the regulators do not foresee the conse-
quences of the change.
For example, one cause of the S&L crisis was a rule change
that allowed savings and loans, which had been driven to the
verge of bankruptcy by the high inflation of the 1970s, to expand
their lending activities.1 6 While banks were permitted to lend in
a number of different areas prior to the deregulation of the early
1980s, the activities in which S&Ls could engage were severely
limited. By the mid-1980s however, the pendulum had swung in
the other direction and S&Ls were allowed to engage in a wide
variety of lending practices. However, they still were not subject
to the regulations applicable to normal banks. 17 The intentions
were good-save the S&Ls-but Congress inadvertently created
an economic crisis.
Similarly, one cause of the mortgage crises that helped trig-
ger the current recession was a relaxation of lending standards,
designed to give more people access to the American dream of
owning a home. A 1999 New York Times article discussing easing
credit requirements for subprime borrowers noted:
[I]n moving, even tentatively, into this new area of lend-
ing, Fannie Mae is taking on significantly more risk,
which may not pose any difficulties during flush economic
15 Id.
16 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), History of the Eighties-Lessons
for the Future, Volume I: An Examination of the Banking Crises of the 1980s and Early
1990s 167, 167-72 (1997), online at http/www.fdic.gov/bank/historicalhistory/167
188.pdf (visited Sept 28, 2010).
17 The Savings and Loans industry was deregulated by the Depository Institutions
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub L No 96-221 (1980), codified at 12
USC § 226 (2006) and the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub L
No 97-320 (1982), codified at 12 USC § 226 (2006). According to the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, "Legislative actions in the early 1980s were designed to aid the
S&L industry but in fact increased the eventual cost of the crisis." FDIC, Banking Crises
at 175 (cited in note 15).
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times. But the government-subsidized corporation may
run into trouble in an economic downturn, prompting a
government rescue similar to that of the savings and loan
industry in the 1980s.18
We chose to ignore the risks and plunged ahead, relying on the
safeguards, the gatekeepers, the presumed sufficiency of the reg-
ulatory practices in place, and perhaps the unrealistic hope that
the next downturn would not come. We were wrong.
III. DETERRING CRIMINAL CONDUCT AND EXCESSIVE PRACTICES
DURING THE NEXT TURN OF THE BUSINESS CYCLE
Although we will never be able to stop white-collar crime en-
tirely, it is possible for us to alter the systemic and environmen-
tal factors that lead "opportunists" and members of the "go
along" crowd to engage in deleterious behavior. Increased
resources should be dedicated to investigating and prosecuting
white-collar crime-in good economic times as well as bad. Ex-
cessive practices with negative consequences for society should
be criminalized, and penalties should be raised on other crimes
to increase their deterrent value. Better regulatory systems
should be developed. Perhaps most importantly, we should foster
a spirit of transparency in the business world through the use of
mandatory disclosure.
A. Increased Prosecutions and Penalties
One of the most powerful deterrents to misconduct is an in-
creased threat of prosecution. Prosecutions are essential to pun-
ish wrongdoers, maintain the rule of law, and deter future
wrongdoing.
When the threat of prosecution is more certain than specula-
tive, an opportunist will not take risks. A "can do" accountant is
less likely to provide questionable opinions if there is a substan-
tial certainty that he will be caught and punished.
Prosecution is often the first line of response when criminal
behavior or excessive practices are exposed. As is happening to-
day, task forces are created to determine what went wrong and
what should be done. Increased resources are devoted to prosecu-
tion, allowing for more prosecutors, investigators, field agents,
and accountants. Prosecutions are publicized.
18 Steven A. Holmes, Fannie Mae Eases Credit to Aid Mortgage Lending, NY Times
C2 (Sept 30, 1999).
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Prosecutors may also pursue cases against those engaging in
excessive practices that do not fall clearly within the scope of ex-
isting law, but rather in legal gray areas that have not previous-
ly been prosecuted. Such cases are more likely to be pursued
where the losses have been massive or the victims are wide-
spread. Convictions are more likely to occur in a climate of anger
over the economy.
Congress rushes to enact new laws to criminalize conduct
that previously may not have been covered by criminal laws, and
to increase the penalties for established offenses. For example, in
1986, before the Sentencing Guidelines, there were circum-
stances in which you could have participated in a financial fraud
in which losses totaled in the millions, been convicted, and re-
ceived only probation for that offense. If you committed the very
same offense in 2006 after the Enron and WorldCom debacles,
you would have faced a very different outcome. Under the
Sentencing Guidelines in effect at that time-still widely fol-
lowed though no longer mandatory-a conviction would have re-
quired the court to impose a sentence of a minimum of thirty
years to life without parole.1 9
The recent financial crisis has prompted a similar reaction.
For example, on May 20, 2009, President Obama signed the
Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009.20 This new law
increased funding to add prosecutors and agents; authorized
$165 million per year for hiring fraud prosecutors and investiga-
tors in the Justice Department, including special agents and fo-
rensic analysts for the mortgage and financial fraud program;21
and amended the fraud statutes to include TARP and stimulus
funds. 22
This type of legislation tracks the historical responses to
economic downturns. But expanding prosecutorial resources and
increasing prosecutions alone are not enough.
19 For an offender with no criminal history, the Guidelines impose a sentence of 360
months to life for an offense classified as an Offense Level of 42. US Sentencing Commis-
sion, Guidelines Manual (USSG) § 5A (2009). Beginning with a base Offense Level of 6 for
all basic economic offenses, USSG § 2B1.l(a), the Guidelines increase the Offense Level
by 30 for offenses involving the loss of $400 million or greater, USSG § 2B1.1(b)(1)(P), and
by a further 6 levels if the crime involved 250 or more victims, USSG § 2B1.1(b)(2)(C),
bringing the crime's Offense Level to 42.
20 Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 (FERA), Pub L No 111-21 (2009),
codified in various sections of Title 18 and 31.
21 Id at § 3.
22 Id at § 2 (cited in notes 19 and 20).
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Simply put, not everyone who engaged in wrongdoing can be
prosecuted. The US Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois
is responsible for all federal criminal prosecutions, as well as all
civil cases in which the United States is a party, that occur in the
eighteen counties in the Northern District-home to a population
of approximately nine million people. Yet the Office employs only
approximately 160 Assistant United States Attorneys. 23 By con-
trast, the largest law firms in Chicago have over 300 attorneys
each in Chicago alone. It is simply not possible for the 160
Assistant US Attorneys to prosecute every federal offense that
occurs in the Northern District.
Moreover, prosecutions consume vast amounts of time and
money. The process of prosecution is long and complex. During
the investigation phase, grand jury subpoenas are issued, agents
conduct interviews, and the parties retain counsel. This all takes
time; the course of an average investigation is measured in
years. If an indictment issues, it is limited to a small number of
people. Trials themselves can last for months, and the appeals
process goes on for years. For example, Enron collapsed in 2001.
The Department of Justice's Enron Task Force was formed in
2002.24 In October 2009, more than eight years after Enron col-
lapsed, the Supreme Court agreed to hear Jeff Skilling's appeal. 25
The prosecution of a single individual consumes huge amounts of
DOJ time, money, and resources, with the risk of no return if the
defendant walks free.
Even when the prosecution is successful, it is simply impos-
sible for the amount of loss to be recouped by prosecution alone.
In the S&L crisis of the 1980s, it is estimated that S&Ls lost
$160.1 billion, with the US government spending $124 billion to
shore up failed banks.26 The government responded by creating
strike forces in twenty-seven cities, and a thousand FBI agents
secured six hundred convictions-but only $130 million in resti-
tution was recouped. 27
23 "About Us," United States Attorney's Office Northern District of Illinois, online at
http/www.justice.gov/usaoflraboutusmdex.html (visited Sept 30, 2010).
24 Corporate Fraud Task Force, 2008 Report to the President 1.3 (2009) (cited in note
9).
25 John R. Emshwiller, Supreme Court to Hear Appeal of Enron's Skilling, Wall St J
A6 (Oct 14, 2009).
26 General Accounting Office, Financial Audit: Resolution Trust Corp.'s 1995 and
1994 Financial Statements, 13 (1996), online at http;//www.gao.gov/archive/1996/
ai96123.pdf (visited Sept 28, 2010).
27 Proposals to Fight Fraud and Protect Taxpayers, including: HR 1748, the "Fight
Fraud Act of 2009"; HR 1292, to amend Title I of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968; HR 1667, the "War Profiteering Prevenfion Act of 2009"; HR 1788,
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In sum, prosecutions are necessary, but it is important to
remember their role and their limitations.
B. Better Regulatory Systems
For the reasons identified above, prosecutions in the midst of
an economic downturn are no substitute for effective regulation
during times of economic prosperity. A regulatory system that
identifies problems before they become significant and that pro-
hibits excessive practices will have a significantly greater impact
than will subsequent prosecutions.
C. Understanding and Disclosure
To successfully deter problematic behavior, there must be a
third element besides increased prosecution and effective regula-
tion. The final systemic factor that encourages the growth of
criminal and excessive behavior is lack of knowledge and under-
standing by the regulators.
To address this factor, we must do two things. First, regula-
tors must be aware of the problematic conduct, which means set-
ting up reporting systems and incentivizing self-reporting of
those practices that have potential for abuse. And second, once
regulators become aware of the conduct, they have to understand
the implications of these practices. If the regulators who review
the reports and disclosures do not understand the nature of the
conduct and its consequences, they cannot address it appropri-
ately.
Many of these financial transactions are so complex and so-
phisticated that to develop adequate reporting systems and to
understand what is revealed by those systems requires a serious
commitment of substantial resources. It is clear from the finan-
cial disaster of the last two years that the regulators did not un-
derstand many aspects of the market that they were called upon
to regulate. 28 Indeed, it is clear that many of the products that
the "False Claims Corrections Act"; HR 1779, the "Financial Crimes Resources Act of
2009"; HR 1793, the "Money Laundering Correction Act of 2009"; and HR 78, the "Stop
Mortgage Fraud Act" before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 111th Cong, 1st Sess
37 (Apr 1, 2009) (statement of John S. Pistole, Deputy Director, Federal Bureau of
Investigation), citing S 331, 11th Cong, at § 2(3).
28 See, for example, Binyamin Applebaum and David Cho, Fed's Approach to
Regulation Left Banks Exposed to Crisis, Wash Post Al (Dec 21, 2009) ("The Fed's failure
to foresee the crisis or to require adequate safeguards happened in part because it did not
understand the risks that banks were taking, according to documents and interviews
with more than three dozen current and former government officials, bank executives and
regulatory experts.").
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were being sold and that contributed to this disaster were under-
stood by very few people. The lack of regulation of these products
turned out to have devastating consequences.
The collapse of Bear Stearns provides an interesting exam-
ple. 29 At one point the chairman of Bear Stearns, a lifelong Wall
Street investment banker, visited the trading floor to talk with
traders and see how things were going. One of the traders of
fixed income securities interviewed for the book commented that
based on the dialogue during that visit, he believed the chairman
never really understood the esoteric financial products that Bear
Stearns was selling or what it was that they owned. Indeed, he
said it would take years to understand what he was doing. 30
One way the government can and does deal with limited en-
forcement resources is to incentivize private organizations to po-
lice themselves and disclose what they have learned. Twenty
years ago, the government understood the need to take this ap-
proach when it promulgated the Sentencing Guidelines for
Organizational Offenders. 31 The Guidelines provided that an or-
ganization convicted of a crime would face a significantly en-
hanced sentence if high-level personnel were involved. 32
Conversely, it would face a significantly reduced sentence if it
had an effective compliance program in place and if it voluntarily
disclosed conduct to-and otherwise cooperated with-
prosecutors. 33
In the wake of those Guidelines, other government agencies
such as the SEC and the Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices also began providing incentives to corporations to police
themselves and increasing penalties for those that did not volun-
tarily comply. As a result, more and more corporations made a
real effort to adopt strong compliance programs. As they did so,
our society's basic expectations about corporate responsibilities
changed. Twenty years ago, a corporation with a strong
compliance program that required self-reporting of misconduct
was ahead of the curve. Today, strong compliance programs are
commonplace, and the failure to have one at all is viewed as
29 See generally William D. Cohan, House of Cards: A Tale of Hubris and Wretched
Excess on Wall Street (Doubleday 2009).
30 Id at 291 (cited in note 27) ("Cayne, the former broker, had only a vague under-
standing of all of these exotic financial instruments that Specter's salesmen and traders
were creating.").
31 See Diana E. Murphy, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations, 87
Iowa L Rev 697 (2002).
32 USSG at § 8C2.5(b) (cited in note 18).
33 USSG at § 8C2.5(f) (cited in notes 18 and 30).
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grossly negligent.34 The question is no longer "Do you have a
compliance program?"-rather, it has become "How well did you
implement it?"
Indeed, a few years ago the government took the position in
a False Claims Act case that the mere failure to have an effective
compliance program satisfied the "knowingly and willfully"
standard of intent under the False Claims Act. The court did not
reject that theory. 35 Civil suits against corporate officers and di-
rectors alleging failures to investigate and report wrongdoing
have also served as a strong incentive to change the way corpora-
tions do business.
Yet in the middle of this changing regime came the Enron
debacle and other accounting scandals of the last decade. The
response was the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 36 Before Sarbanes-Oxley,
corporate officers could point to the auditors, accountants, and
lawyers, and say, "It was their fault, not mine." Sarbanes-Oxley
changed that. It not only introduced a new regulatory scheme, it
added reporting and disclosure requirements as part of the ma-
trix. Sarbanes-Oxley has significantly reduced the likelihood of
the type of corporate practices that led to the WorldCom and
Enron situations. 37 The main drivers of this change have been
the threat of prosecution, the obligation to report questionable
conduct, and the obligation of CEOs and CFOs to put their own
signatures on public filings. These officers must now certify that
financial statements comply with securities laws and fairly
present the company's finances, with the threat of personal lia-
bility if those filings are later shown to be inaccurate.
34 See, for example, Jeffery M. Cross, Corporate Antitrust Liability and Compliance
Programs, in Frederick Z. Banks and Theodore L. Banks, eds, Corporate Legal
Compliance Handbook, 2008 Supplement § 2.04[C] (Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492 (Del
Ch 2003) ("raises the possibility that there may be liability for a director's gross negli-
gence in failing to institute an adequate system to monitor a corporation's compliance
with the laws").
35 US v Merck-Medco Managed Care, LLC, 336 F Supp 2d 430, 440-41 (ED Pa 2004)
(refusing to dismiss case where lower-level employees allegedly submitted false claims
even though there was no allegation that upper management was aware of the actions of
the lower-level employees).
36 Pub L No 107-204 (2002), codified at 15 USC § 7201 et seq (2006).
37 See, for example, Alan Rappeport, Report: Financial Fraud a Challenge Despite
Sarbox, CFO.com (July 22, 2008), online at http;//www.cfo.con/article.cfm/11779692/
?f=rsspage (visited Sept 28, 2010) (noting that a recent report from the Association of
Certified Fraud Examiners found that "publicly traded companies suffered fewer losses
from frauds of all types if they had implemented Sarbanes-Oxley controls. Indeed, their
median losses from all types of fraud were 70 to 96 percent lower than corporations that
had not yet implemented those controls").
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Coupled with Sarbanes-Oxley's increased criminal and civil
penalties, these requirements have forced corporate officers to
pay attention and take responsibility for the actions of the corpo-
rations. Officers can no longer rely upon "can do" accountants to
relieve them from their responsibilities because they are now
individually liable. Lawyers who practice in the areas of white-
collar crime and corporate governance generally agree that
Sarbanes-Oxley-and the certification requirements in particu-
lar-have resulted in a sea change in the behavior of many cor-
porate officers and directors.
D. Creating an Effective Regime to Deter White-Collar
Criminal Behavior and Excessive Practices
So does a system using all three approaches-prosecutorial
attention, self-reporting and public disclosures, and an enhanced
regulatory system-work? Our experience with Sarbanes-Oxley
suggests that it does.
A second example of an effective regime can be found in
Illinois, where lawyers have first-hand knowledge of the change
in attitudes that such regulatory and reporting schemes, coupled
with the threat of prosecution, can bring. The catalyst for those
changes was Operation Greylord-the federal undercover inves-
tigation of the corrupt Cook County court system in the 1980s.38
The investigation revealed that certain Cook County judges were
routinely accepting bribes and fixing cases. Operation Greylord
ultimately resulted in the indictment of ninety-two people, in-
cluding seventeen judges, forty- eight lawyers, eight policemen,
ten deputy sheriffs, eight court officials, and one state legislator.
In all the years leading up to Greylord, nobody said anything
about corruption in the courts. Nobody reported the misconduct.
Nobody complained that clerks took bribes to call cases. Lawyers
believed they did not have an obligation to report misconduct.
There were no consequences for failing to report misconduct.
Quite the opposite: many believed that reporting the misconduct
would have adverse consequences.
Despite the Greylord prosecutions and their publicity, it was
the Illinois Supreme Court, in exercising its regulatory function,
that ultimately played a significant role in deterring corruption
in the Illinois judicial system. In 1988, that court handed down
38 For an overview of Operation Greylord, see James Tuohy and Rob Warden,
Greylord: Justice, Chicago Style (Putnam 1989).
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its most well-known ethical pronouncement, In re Himmel.39 The
court announced that members of the legal profession have an
ethical obligation to report ethical violations by other lawyers,
and that failure to report another lawyer's violation may put
one's own law license in jeopardy. Faced with the knowledge that
their own law licenses could be revoked for failure to report pos-
sible misconduct, lawyers took the Supreme Court's decision very
seriously and ethical complaints increased dramatically. The
practice of ex parte meetings between lawyers and judges came
to an abrupt halt. Moreover, once lawyers and judges realized
that they could no longer trust their colleagues and counterparts
to keep quiet, judicial corruption was no longer able to flourish.
So requiring an individual or corporation to report miscon-
duct and punishing those that engage in misconduct significantly
increases deterrence, especially among the group of people who
are tempted to commit crimes because they think their conduct
will go unreported. And it deters those who simply go along with
others' misdeeds when there is no consequence for doing so.
CONCLUSION
Very little has changed since the Lehman collapse a year
ago. Perhaps even more troubling, as the economy begins to re-
cover, we have lost focus on the failures of the recent past and
have shifted focus to other issues. 40 We may not have learned the
lessons of this recession.
In October 2009, the Inspector General of the Treasury
Department testified in front of Congress about widespread
fraud in connection with the first-time home-buyer tax credit, an
$8,000 tax credit for the purchase of a first home. 41 This program
was put into place only within the last year. Because no controls
were established when the program was implemented, people
have already claimed tax credits without having to prove they
deserved them. The IRS has now identified 167 suspected crimi-
nal schemes and has started nearly 107,000 examinations of po-
tential civil violations where the money was not used to purchase
a home; the potential violations total approximately $856 mil-
39 533 NE2d 790 (11 1988).
40 See, for example, Mark Whitehouse, Economic Crisis Ebbs, Systemic Risks Don't,
Wall St J A2 (Dec 8, 2009).
41 Luke Mullins, First-Time Home Buyer Tax Credit: All Sorts of Sketchy Claims, US
News & World Rept (Oct 22, 2009), online at http;//www.usnews.conmoney/blogs/the-
home-front/2009/10/22/first-time-home-buyer-tax-credit-all-sorts-of-sketchy-claims
(visited Sept 30, 2010).
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
lion. Much could have been prevented by having an appropriate
regulatory framework-perhaps by merely requiring proof of
home ownership.
As we have seen from past experience, the regulatory fail-
ures exposed by the current downturn must be addressed now,
while these problems are fresh, in order to effectively deter fu-
ture misconduct. We cannot make the mistake we have made in
the past of assuming that the troubles are behind us. Paul
Krugman, in a recent article in the New York Times, quoted
some of the world's great economists who over the last several
years "believed they had things under control" and who said that
"the central problem of depression-prevention had been solved."42
These economists, including Ben Bernanke, expressed the belief
that "markets were inherently stable, indeed that stocks and
other assets were always priced just right."43 Indeed Mr.
Bernanke stated in 2004 that "changes in economic institutions,
technology, business practices or other structural features of the
economy have improved the ability of the economy to absorb
shocks."44
As we begin to climb out of the recession, we must not as-
sume that it cannot happen again. We cannot assume that over-
sight failures will not result in financial scandals like the ones
that have occurred over the last decade. What we have learned
as the global economy becomes ever more complex and ever more
interconnected is that it takes less of a trigger to cause a melt-
down, and meltdowns can be more severe when they do happen.
This means that it is more important than ever to focus on pre-
vention as well as prosecution.
It is possible to address these problems and thus minimize
the dangers caused by future recurrences. The Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 45 was signed into
law by President Obama on July 21, 2010.46 According to the
42 Paul Krugman, How Did Economists Get It So Wrong?, NY Times Mag 36, 36 (Sept
2, 2009), quoting Robert Lucas, online at http //www.nytimes.con2009/09/06/magazine/
06Economic-t.html (visited Sept 30, 2010).
43 Id (cited in note 38).
44 Ben S. Bernanke, Speech to the Eastern Economic Association (Feb 20, 2004),
online at http//www.federalreserve.gov/BOARDDOCS/SPEECHES/2004/20040220/
default.htm (visited Sept 30, 2010).
45 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub L No 111-203,
124 Stat 1376 (2010).
46 Doug Mills, Obama Signs Overhaul of Financial System, NY Times (July 21, 2010),
online at http;//www.nytimes.co/2010/07/22/business/22regulate.html (visited Oct 4,
2010).
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Act's supporters, the Dodd-Frank Act will provide transparency
for exotic instruments; provide tough new rules for transparency
and accountability on Wall Street; and dramatically increase the
amount of resources dedicated to enforcing laws already on the
books.47 However, it will be years before rules and regulations
promulgated under the Act go into effect and considerable
amounts of money will be spent in an attempt to shape the rule-
making process. 48 Thus the debate continues, and as the economy
improves, the appetite for increased regulation will likely dimin-
ish. But without meaningful prosecution, regulation, and disclo-
sure, we can be sure that when the next recession comes, it will
be attended with the same revelations of financial and business
scandal as always.
47 See, for example, United States Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs, Brief Summary of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, online at http//banking.senate.gov/public/_files/070110_DoddFrank_
Wall StreetReform-comprehensive summaryFinal.pdf (visited Oct 4, 2010).
48 Phil Mattingly, 'Torturous' Dodd-Frank Rulemaking Can Succeed, Regulators Say,
Bloomberg Businessweek (Sept 30, 2010), online at http /www.businessweek.con/news/
2010-09-30/-torturous-dodd-frank-rulemaking-can-succeed-regulators-say.html (visited
Oct 4, 2010).

